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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH FINANCE COMPANY OF
SALT LAKE,
Plaintiff and Appellant~

No.
10179

vs.
TI-IOMAS G. PATRICK and l\10NA \,
RAE PA~RICK,
'
Defendants and Respondentr. J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF

~rHE

KIND OF CASE

This is an action by plaintiff, an industrial loan
corporation, on a promissory note given by defendants
to recover a deficiency balance owing after foreclosure
of a chattel mortgage by advertisement and sale. Defendant, ,-fhomas G. Patrick, claimed the obligation
was discharged in his bankruptcy, and plaintiff contended it was not so discharged because the defendant
3
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f~Tni~hed ,pl~intiff., a

false -~nd fraudulent . financial
statetiJ.ent in ·writing as. an iriduc~merit for the extension
of. ~r~dit: and. the· making of the
loan.
.
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
At the pre-trial the Court granted defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.-as to the defendant, Thomas G.
Patrick, and gave judgment as prayed as to defendant,
Mona Rae Patrick.·

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment granting
the Motion to Dismiss as to defendant, Thomas G.
Patrick.
.

.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is an industrial loan company of the
State of Utah. Defe:qdants had borrowed money from
the plaintiff and given security therefor in the form
of a ·chattel mortgage. The note on which this action
is .ba,sed was given in connection with a renewal. of a
previous note. and .th.e renewal of a previous mortgage.,
said mortgage covering an old motor vehicle and items
of. household .. furniture and furnishings. The plaintiff
had. f9reclosed the chattel mortgage by advertisement
and sale in .accordance with the statutes of the State
of Utah, . after default by the defendants, and there
I
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ren1ained owing after application of the proceeds from
such foreclosure a deficiency balance of $1,003.00. At
the time of the renewal of the said obligation and the
signing of the note on which this action is brought and
of the chattel mortgage which had secured the same,
the defendants, as an inducement to the renewal of
the loan and the furnishing of additional funds, executed and delivered to the plaintiff a statement in
writing as to their financial condition, which said statement was introduced at the pre-trial as Exhibit PT 2.
At the pre-trial, it was admitted ,through statements
of counsel, that the defendant, Mona Rae Patrick, had
no defense and that plaintiff was entitled to judgment
against her as prayed. (R 7). It was likewise admitted
that judgment would be entered against Thomas G.
Patrick as prayed were it not for the fact that he had
taken bankruptcy and had been discharged from his
dischargeable debts, said defendant contending that
the debt sued upon was so discharged and plaintiff contending that it was not discharged by reason of the
furnishing of the false financial statement (Ex. PT 2)
as an inducement to the loan and extension of credit.
(R 7).
It was further admitted that all charges made by
plaintiff and all things done in connection with the
loan were in accordance with the statutes and that the
amount of the renewal note included therein a charge
of $19.04, which was a proper charge under the provisions of the statutes of the State of Utah, 7-8-3 ( 1)
(c) , L" tah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. ( R 8) .

5
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Exhibit PT ~ introduced and received at the pre-trial
shows .that the financial statement (Ex. PT 2) omitted
substantial obligations owing by the defendants at the
time of the execution of said Exhibit PT 2 and the
execution of the note sued upon.
· Motion to dismiss was the made on behalf of defendant, Thomas G. Patrick, "due to the fact that the
company h~s charged' for making· an investigation and
they, should have found this by the charge ... and did
not' rely on the statement of the· creditor." (R 8).
-- ,.

The Court then
granted the said defendants' Motio~ to Dismiss "upon th~. ground and for the reason
~ha.t ._~hen. the plaintiff company charged $19.04, as it
4ad a_ -~igh_t to .do under the statutes, then it could not
rely upo~ the statements made by the defendant, but
was obligated to spend that $19.04 in making its own
investigation;
that if it did not intend to rely upon the
'
investigttti<?n it_. ~ade in determining whether or not
to make .th~ loan, it should not have charged the fee."
(_R 9)..

..

.

'

/

.

'

.

.

;

-

.

ARGUMENT
POINT-I.
THE COLLECTION BY THE PLAINTIFF
OF A CHARGE PERMITTED BY THE STATUTE -.~O:R "EXAMINING AND INVESTIGATING THE C_HARACTER AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE BORROWER'' DID NOT

6
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L\.S A l\iATTER OF LAW RELIEVE

THE
BORROWER FROM THE CONSEQUENCES
OF ISSUING AND FURNISHING FALSE
AND FRi\.UDULENT INFORMATION ON 1-\_
FINANC.IAL STATEMENT.
There is no contention but that the plaintiff operated in every manner consistent with and as authorized
by the statutes of the State of Utah and that the charges
made by it were in conformity therewith. The statute
specifically involved is included under the general
powers of industrial loan corporations and reads in part
as follows:
"7 -8-3. General powers -

Every industrial
loan corporation shall have power:
. . . (c) To charge a fee of $2.00 or less on
loans of $100.00 or less and not to exceed 27o
or $20.00, 'vhichever is smaller, on loans in excess
of $100.00 for expense incurred by it in examining and investigating the character and circumstances of the borrower.''
The section of the Bankruptcy Act which would
prevent the discharge of the obligation sued upon is
contained in Title II_, Section 35, U.S.C.A._, as amended, which reads:
" (a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts . . .
except such as ... ( 2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or
false representations, or for obtaining money or
property on credit or obtaining an extension or
rene"\tval of credit in reliance upon a materially

7
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false statement in writing respecting his financial
. condition :q1ade or published or caused to be made
or published in any manner whatsoever with
intent to deceive ... "
It should be noted that the ruling of the Court was
not based upon the fact, or upon any contention, that
thete was not or could not be presented evidenc~ that
the defendant was· guilty. of ''obtaining an ex'tension
or rene~al of credit in reliance upon a materially fals'e
statement· in w·riting ·respecting his financial condition"
etc., so' a~ to prevent his discharge under the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Ac·t above quoted. On the contrary,
the Court took the view that, notwithstanding any false
or fraudulent 'representations or· the submission of any
false statement··· in writing; no matter how flagrant
the misrepres·entations therein might be, or regardless
of whether or not the plaintiff did in fact rely upon
such:· statements, that plaiiltiff could not clailn such
r~liance by virtue ,Qf. its having taken the $19.04 which
the statute permitted it to take. Such surely cannot
be ~he la'Y, as it would be an open invitation to fraud .

.we do not' argue with the general proposition of
law tha,t when one makes an independent investigation
upon which he relies, that he is ordinarily chargeable
with· knowledge .of the facts which his investigation
should· aisclose.. The- matter does not, however, end
there. The rule: applicable to this niatter is stated in
23 Am .. Jur. "Fraud and Deceit" Section 144, Page
945, as follows:
~

.

I

,.

,

~

-.
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''The 1nere fact that one makes an independent
investigation or examination, or consults with
others, does not necessarily show that he relies
on his own judgment or on the information so
gained, rather than on the representations of
the other party, nor does it give rise to a presumption of law to that effecto If, under the circumstances, he is unable to learn the truth from
such examination or investigation or, without
fault on his part, does not learn it and in fact
relies on the representations, he is entitled to
relief, all other ingredients of liability being
present."
The rule is similarly stated in 37 Corpus Juris
Secundum~ "Fraud," Section 37 (b), Page 286, as
follows:
" ... it is generally held that one in fact relying wholly on representations is not barred fron1
relief merely because he made independent inquiry. Redress will not be denied nor lack of
reliance conclusively presumed where the investigation failed to reveal the truth, nor will an
unsuccessful investigation necessarily deprive the
defrauded party of his right to rely on the
speaker's representations. This is especially true
where the investigation was rendered unsuccessful by the deliberate artifice of the speaker, ...
or because the facts were peculiarly within the
knowledge of the speaker and difficult for the
hear,er to ascertain.~~ (Emphasis supplied).
The Court assumed that by the expeniture of
$19.04, which was the maximum the plaintiff could
charge under the statute for investigation fee, that
plaintiff must be presumed to have learned everything
9
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there was to know .and everything which it required
as to the· financial stability of the borrower and that it
therefore relied exclusively upon such information and
not upon any representations or information furnished
by the borrower:. Such, of course, is a fallacy on its face.
Let us examine- the practical situation in the light of
the rules of law above herein referred to.
As indicated, the Legis1ature limited the amount
that could· .be charged for the examination fee to 2<fo
of. the amount of the loan, which in this case was $19.04.
In determini~g whether or not a loan should be made,
and investiga~ing the character and circumstances of
the borrower, there are a myraid of things whuch must
be considered. Where the loan is to be secured by a
chattel mortgage, as it was in this case, it requires someone fro~ the. _lending institution to go out to the home
and check and list th.e items to be included on the mortgage. This entails an examination of the items and
inquiries with regard to ownership thereof. It likewise
inclu4es checking through -the Credit Bureau as well
as the public records which will reflect any information
with regard to the borrower. These methods and means
of checking into the credit -and circun1stances of the
borrower,. if followed through to their fullest, would,
as will re.adily be seen_, require an expenditure of time,
and therefore money, far in excess of the amount which
the statute allows. But, this is not the problem involved
here. The -rea]·probleni is that no matter how much time
or :money might be expended by the lender in an inves-

10
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tigation, all of the pertinent information as relates
to the financial status of the borrower cannot be obtained through any sources available to the lender. A
considerable part of such information is necessarily
within the sole and peculiar knowledge of the borrower.
The lender must look to him and depend upon his representations as to such matters. Let us elaborate on this
phase of the matter.
In connection with a proposed loan to an ordinary
borrower, the lender checks all sources of public information and checks information sources such as credit
bureaus, the finance companies' local exchanges, banks
and other references given by the borrower, so that
it has run down every source normally available to it, and
such might reflect that the borrower is in reasonably
sound financial circumstances. Assuming, however,
that this borrower then owes $1,000.00 to his father,
$3,000.00 to a friend, and other monies to various individuals, which obligations are unsecured, how, except
through inquiry of the borrower himself, can a lender
know of such obligations which affect the financial
stability of the borrower. How can the lender learn of
obligations which might be owing in connection with
purchases made by the borrower, short of circulating
every wholesaler and retailer in the entire area, and even
beyond? Even such, of course, would not disclose such
obligations owing to individuals as relates to obligations for property purchased on Conditional Sales
Contracts. Except as relates to motor vehicles, there is

11
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no public record of such obligations or any liens represented thereby. How, except through inquiry of the
borrower can a lender learn of such obligations?
If, as the- Court held, the lender cannot rely upon
the" representaions in a written financial statement by
the borrower, as to his obligations, "'Ne assume the lender
likewise could not rely upon representations as to ownership of chattels which might be included on the mortgage·. As to such, how can the lender know whether
or not such chattels are clear, or what if any obligations exist 'against the same, unless he can rely upon
the representations of the borrower.
It should thus become glaringly apparent that by
making the charge permitted by statute for investigating, the lender should not be presumed to have ascertained or be chargeable with knowledge as to the character and circumstances of the borrower, except at most
as to those matters which reasonably and ordinarily
could and would be ascertained through inquiry through
regular and normal channels. Certainly, as the authorities above cited indicate, the lender should not be chargeable with knowledge as to facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of the borrower.
If any other conclusion is reached than that the
borrower is, when he makes a financial state1nent, bound
at his peril to truthfully set forth his circumstances,
there is an open invitation to every borrower to defraud
the lender. The law does not, we believe, encourage,
nor sanction and protect such deceit. Surely, logic and

12
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common sense would indicate that the Legislature
believed the lender of money under the Industrial Loan
Act ought be reimbursed for expenses actually incurred by it up to the amount of 2ro of the loan in
endeavoring to learn about the· borrower through the
sources ordinarily open to it through normal inquiries.
It surely did not contemplate that if such expenditures were made in good faith that the lender then was
precluded from relying upon representations made by
the borrower as to his financial circumstances, and particularly as would relate to matters which could not,
through any other reasonable means be ascertained.
There is a rather extensive discussion of this matter
of reliance where an independent investigation has been
made in the case of Baylies vs. Vanden Boom_, (Wyo.)
278 Pac. 551, 70 A.L.R. 924, preceding an annotation
in that latter volume. The Court therein cites numerous
cases with regard to the matter. The Court, quoting
from another case, to-wit, Hetland vs. Bilstad_, (Iowa)
118 N.W. 422, stated:
"The fact that one does not procure the information which ordinary prudence would dictate
will not defeat recovery, where ,notwithstanding
this, h~ relies on the sellers' misrepresentations."
Again quoting with approval from the case of
Smith vs. Werkheiser (Michigan) 115 N.W. 964, the
Court stated:
"It is urged that inasmuch as the books were
placed at their disposal complainants were bound
to ascertain the truth and to place no reliance

13
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upon the false statements that had been made
to them. This is not the law. A defrauded party
does not owe to the party who defrauds him an
obligation to use diligence to discover the fraud."
Later in the decision, that Court quotes with ap .
proval from Omar Oil & Gas Co. vs. Mackenzie Oil Co.)
138 Atlantic 392, which involved a suit brought on
notes and wherein the defense was that execution was
induced by· fraud, contention being made that an independent investigation was conducted and hence the
representations were not relied upon. 'l,he quoted language of the Court reads:
"Relative to false representations, as a ground
of defense, there is one fundamental rule, agreed
upon by all the authorities, viz., that a buyer
shall not be precluded from relying on such
representations unless it clearly appears that
he relied on his own investigation, and not on
the representation. Mr. Pomeroy, at section
895, note 4, states it thus:
" 'The question is, did the party rely on the
representation or on his own knowledge? To
obviate the effect of the representation, it must
be clearly and conclusively shown that he relied
on his own knowledge. This, the general doctrine
and .the qualifications both demand.'
'' . . . The better and more reasonable doctrine,
the one consistent with the fundamental rule,
and supported by the majority of well-considered
cases, including those in Texas, is this: The
buyer will not be prevented from availing himself of false re:Rresentations of the seller. unless
he makes an investigation on his own account

14
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and it is of such character as to fully acquaint
him with the essential facts. If the buyer made
an -investigation that was free and unhampered,
and conditions were such that he must have obtained the information he desired_, or the facts he
seeks .to know were as obvious to him as to the
seller_, and their means of knowledge were equal_,
he is presumed to have relied on his own investigation, and not on the representation. In such
case he could not have been misled by the seller.''
(Emphasis supplied).
It will be observed that in this and in all other
cases which we have been able to find, the only time
when it is held as a 1natter of law that reliance was not
placed upon false and fraudulent representations are
in circumstances where the party so claiming to rely
made a full and unhampered investigation and where
the circumstances were such that he must have learned,
or be in a position to learn, the facts from such investigation. We have found no case nor authority which held
that in spite of any independent investigation a person
could not avail himself of false and fraudulent representations made to him if he either ( 1 ) in fact relied
upon them, or, (2) such representations related to
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the one
making such representations, or would be difficult of
ascertainment from other sources.
There is nothing to show that plaintiff lender, had
it tried through every conceivable means of investigation available, could have learned the facts as to the
obligations owing and the financial circumstances of

15
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the defendant borrower in this case. There is nothing
to show that it had access to any means of checking
the items involved and that it failed to do so. Surely,
there can be no presumption of law that by accepting
a fee allowed by statute it had agreed to waive any
legal rights under the Bankruptcy Act, or otherwise,
to which it would be entitled resulting frorn false and
fraudulent representations made to it by a borrower
and as a result of which the plaintiff lender suffered
damages. w-e cannot believe that a borrower, by payment of a maximum of $20.00, automatically purchases
a statutory immunity from the effects of his willful
fraudulent acts.
The construction placed upon the statute by the
Court would, as indicated, place a premium on fraud
and completely relieve persons borrowing money under
the Industrial Loan Act from the necessity of honest
dealing and fair disclosure. Borrowing the words of
the Court in Christensen vs. Jauron (Iowa) 174 N.W.
499, "The law is not thus tender of persons practicing
deceit."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
erred in granting the motion of the defendant, Thomas
G. Patrick, for summary judgment and that the Court's
said Order should be reversed and the case remanded
to the District Court for trial on the issues thereof as
to said defendant.

16
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Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKISS
600 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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